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Holderlin’s Ethical Thinking:
“The Processes of the Actual” in Heidelberg
RICHARD EIDRIDGE
I
It is no news that ethics traffics in oughts, and it is also no news that this is a problem. To say that
rights and goods ought to be distributed according to the difference principle, or according to historical
entitlement, or according to merit; or to say that persons ought to cultivate their talents, or respond to oth
ers with compassion, or lead stable, orderly hves—all these things seem very different from simply describing
what is materially the case. To be sure, descriptions of what is materially the case may themselves be gener
ated in accordance with scarcely articulated norms for regarding things as worthy of notice. The material
frets that we identify may themselves be salient only within human worlds of value and interest. But it is true
nonetheless that determining the type of a given blood sample or calculating the apex of the trajectory of a
projectile launched at a given velocity and angle present fewer problems than figuring out whether one ought
to contribute to a particular charity or whether one ought to blame someone for eating too many cookies.
In the former cases, it is pretty clear what one is to do in order to arrive at an answer, and this supports
confidence that the results at which one arrives are descriptive of what there is, not only projections of our
attitudes.
Moral philosophers have nonetheless often given way to a temptation to suppose that there exists a
class of moral facts, on analogy with material facts, discovery of which might yield definite answers to ques
tions about oughts. Plato is the paradigm case, in supposing that the Good is a standing object open to in
tellectual discovery. The trouble, however, is that such claims to have made discoveries of moral facts have
often functioned as ad hoc rationalizations for moral stances that have not been widely shared. It is cer
tainly not clear that many people will endorse the claim that a discovery through dialectic of the nature of
the Good shows that the best life is the life of the philosopher.
Aristode, with his commitment to the immanence of forms in nature and ordinary life, in contrast sup
poses that all we need to do is to discern what the best people are already up to. We are happily not re
quired to look for Platonic moral superfrets or otherwise elsewhere than at common human life. The dis
covery of appropriate moral norms will be a matter of careful description of the way of life of people of
practical wisdom. But here too there is a problem. Who really possesses practical wisdom? The description
of moral achievements in ordinary practical life seems to be neither trivial nor innocent. Aristotle, for ex
ample, finds in surveying practical life that women “may be inferior and [slaves] wholly worthless.” Fall
ing in with Aristotle’s descriptions of achievements of value in moral life seems to involve endorsing the
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quite sectarian attitudes of a male Greek aristocrat.
It is tempting, then, to conclude that it is always like this. To describe achievements of value seems to
be to project one’s own subjective attitudes onto things, not to discover what there is. When we ourselves
moralize, we produce essentially dramatic acts: projections, not discoveries.
But why should we do that? The moral evaluation of actions and ways of life is very different from the
more evidently worthwhile enterprise of what Quine calls “limning the true and ultimate strucmre of real
ity.”^ Instead of dramatically projecting our own attitudes or, worse yet, submitting to the dramatizings of
others, why not, in the spirit of genuine description, stick to an external standpoint on the facts that people
hold and endorse certain values. These are things people do, but their doing so can not be justified by the
discovery of any moral fiicts. There are no moral truths waiting to be discovered. As Quine puts it, “It is
merely that [moral] values are passed down the generations, imposed by word of mouth, by birch rod and
sugar plum, by acclaim and ostracism, fine, imprisonment. [At best] the moral law of a society ...coordi
nates Ae actual scales of values of the individuals in such a way as to resolve incompatibilities and thus
promote their overall satisfaction.’’
Yet this externalist stance on moral attimdinizing has the characteristically modem appeal of offering
a clear-sighted view of the facts, without projection, also suffers fi:om severe liabilities of its own. It offers
no account of objective interests, acknowledgment of which might justify evaluative stances. Hence it first
of all makes impossible any account of growing up as involving coming to grasp more fully what it is in the
objective interest of persons to be or do, instead casting changes of attitude and aim as mere shifts in sub
jective preference. This seems false to the experience of learning, say, that Bach’s Cello Suites are better
than The Barney Song. Second, it makes impossible any rational resolution of social confiict through ap
peal to an objective interest and available means of satisfying it. On this view, the spoils of social life are of
necessity divided up through plays of violence and counterviolence, at best holding one another in check
under the mask of compromise. The best that can be done is to “coordinate the actual scales of values of
the individuals...,’’ in the manner of Hobbesian political realism.
Perhaps because he takes these pictures of growing up as sheer change in preference and of social
stmctures as necessarily reposing on violence to be insupportable, Northrop Frye remarks that “A serious
human life ...can hardlyBegin until we see an element of illusion in what is really there, and something real
in fantasies about what might be there instead.” That is, it must be possible to think of changes in prefer
ence and of the development of social life otherwise. Our seriousness in thinking that we might affirma
tively lead our lives in accordance with understanding requires that we think of the material facts of prefer
ence and social violence not as simply given, but also as open to transformation through understanding.
This thought of the possibility of transformation based on understanding requires not only disciplined un
derstandings of the causes of material events and of the phenomena of social life, as such understandings
are achieved in the natural and social sciences. It requires further an understanding of objective human
interests—objectively valuable possibilities of shared human life. Without a sense of how the different things
people do may be reciprocally reasonably endorsed as contributing variously to the realization of an objec
tive interest, we either, as Frye puts it, fall into “the subordination of everything creative and scholarly to the
expediences and superstitions of authority..., [ or ] we fly apart into a chaos of rnumally unintelligible elites,
of which those nearest the center of society would soon take control. So atavistic a social regression, in the
present stage of technological development, might well wipe the human race off the planet.”
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So we need a conception of objective human interests. Yet how is this need to be met? Interests are
made evident to us in what people say and do, and in what they may plausibly be imagined to go on to say
and do. Here actual historical pursuits of interests seem troubled by the very phenomena of parochialness
and conflict that we seek to overcome. Various intellectualisms and esoteric fundamentalisms—^putative
new discoveries of an objective interest, accomplished through new techniques—may seem to offer a way
out of historical conflict. But as in Plato they tend to function socially as a favoring of the parochial.
One might stand back quietistically from interests as they have been pursued and simply hope for some
thing better. But this is a counsel of impotence that leaves regnant powers and conflicts in place or one
might simply embrace some already existing strategy of the pursuit of interest. This runs the risks of didac
ticism and authoritarianism, in making no place for those disposed otherwise. How, then, might we both
accept the existence of antagonistically opposed ways of being and regard these opposed ways of being as
serving a common interest?
One well-known solution to this problem is Hegel’s, in both The Phenomenology ofSpirit and The
Philosophy ofRight. Hegel describes historically, in Chapters 6 and 7 of the Phenomenology, how bitterly
opposed social experiments in the pursuit of freedom become progressively more adequate and progres
sively more rationally transparent to one another. He describes in The Philosophy ofRight the structures
and workings of the ideal social institutions now available to us, under which the subjective and objective
points of view, or our opposed particular pursuits and our common interest, might be reconciled. These
descriptions offer us, Hegel holds, the chance
To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present and thereby to
delight in the present — this rational insight is the reconciliation with
actuality which philosophy grants to those who have received the inner
call to comprehend, to preserve their subjective freedom in the realm of
the substantial and at the same time to stand with their subjective
freedom not in a particular and contingent situation, but in what has
being in and for itself.
It is a wonderful idea. But one does not have to be a fullblooded Marxist or Nietzschean nonetheless
to be suspicious of whose particular, competitive interest might be served by the offer of such arecognition
and reconciliation to “those who have received the inner call to comprehend" and thereby also the entitle
ment to rule. Once again philosophers are to be authorities, albeit more historically minded and demo
cratic ones than in Plato. But can historico-philosophical reflection show us how to house divergent sub
jective interests happily and fitly under common social institutions, as Hegel suggests? As Herbert Marcuse
comments: “A strange reconciliation, indeed. There is hardly another philosophical work that reveals more
unsparingly the irreconcilable contradictions of modern society, or that seems more perversely tojacquiesce in them.”
But if not by historical description of an emergent resolution of social antagonisms, then how? How
are we to articulate an objective interest and to identify the social pursuits and institutions that might fur
ther its effective and universal satisfection? To what should one turn what sorts of attentions? How might
one speak of an objective interest—let us say in human freedom—^in such a way that both the ways of the
world and of other human beings can be loved in general and the diversity of ways of being and the values
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of independence and subjective particularity that that diversity supports can be upheld?
It is these questions to which Holderlin develops an especially powerful and plausible not-quite an
swer, but mode of response. Unlike Hegel, Holderhn does not undertake to describe the historical resolu
tion of all social antagonisms. They are too strong for that, and their undoing might even compromise the
value of independence on which Nietzsche will later so much insist, in urging us to love our enemies be
cause they are our enemies: they make for a good fight. But neither does Holderlin stand back quiedstically
in the face of the ways of the world, as do various social and material namralisrns that trace successions of
phenomena from an external standpoint. Instead, in a kind of apotheosis of the social, moral, and human
interest of the lyric as a genre, Holderlin traces his path through partial recognitions of an objective inter
est in freedom, partially embodied in social pursuits, and recognitions also of the waywardness of these
pursuits, of their resistances to reformation, accompanied by a further reactive sense of the value of his
own independence in being unable wholly to submit himself to anything. He carries out, in his lyric writing,
a kind of conversation with himself, in which natural-social life emerges as always something in between a
fully fit home for human freedom and a locus of gramitious and violent oppositions to subjectivity.
I will try to make it clear how Holderlin does this in his poetic writing in detail, how it is above all an
accomplishment of poetic voice in acknowledging one’s condition and its possibilities, in tracing the work
of his poem “Heidelberg.” But in order to establish the depth and range of Holderlin’s interest in moral
theory and in embodied freedom, it will be helpful first to review briefly some of his philosophical writings
about mind and value from the mid-1790s.
Based on close readings of essay fragments and letters from the mid-1790s, Dieter Henrich has use
fully described “Holderlin’s ‘speculative pro and con' [as] an attempt at a ‘unification philosophy’
{Vereinigungsphilosophiel."^ In particular, Holderlin in his philosophical writing attempts to describe
how a free, autonomous, self-conscious moral subject might be united through love with the namral and
social worlds. This philosophical effort remains always an effort marked by swerves and never a completed
unification theory. It arises out of Holderlin’s acceptances first of all of Kant’s critical stance on the impos
sibility of metaphysical knowledge of Being and of the Kantian-Fichtean conception of the moral subject as
both negatively free and capable of autonomy. In Holderlin’s own terms, the separation of the conceptually
conscious and self-conscious moral subject from Being arises out of judgment or Ur-theil, which Holderlin
describes as “the original separation of subject and object, ...that separation through which alone object
and subject become possible, the arche-separation.” Once cast out from oneness with Being and into con
ceptual consciousness and moral freedom, there is no smooth way back. Though the term “Being” “ex
presses the connection between subject and object” and there is a “necessary presupposition of a whole of
which object and subject form the parts,” to think of oneself as an I “is only possible by means of this sepa
ration..To be concepmally conscious, to be reflectively aware of oneself as conceptually conscious,
and to have possibilities of fi-ee action arising out of reflectiveness—^in short, to be a subject—is necessar
ily to be not simply at one with what there is, however one has arisen out of namre. Hence, contrary to
Fichte’s metaphysics of identity, “identity is not = to absolute Being.” Contrary to any recuperative meta
physics of Being and the subject’s place in it, and rather in the Kantian spirit, we “cannot know the world in
itself nor of itself.”
Yet Holderlin does not accept a Kantian-Fichtean moral practice of eternal agentive striving. Instead,
he takes on from Jacobi’s pantheist skepticism a sense that the world, including both subjects and objects.
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is informed by love, even if how this is so or how this love might be accepted and reahzed cannot be known
theoretically. Hdlderlin’s sense of the namral and social worlds as suffused with love and meaningfulness
that simply present themselves to a subject sporadically, rather than being winnable through striving, comes
out clearly in a 1793 letter, in which he recalls
those divine hours when 1 return from the womb of inspiring nature or
from the grove at Ilissus where, resting among disciples of Plato, I would
follow with my eyes the flight of the magnificent one as he roves through
the dark distances of the primal world, or where, with dizziness, I would
follow him into the utmost depth, to the remotest regions of the land of
spirit, where the soul of the world emanates its life into the thousand
pulses of nature, whereto the effluvious forces return in their
immeasurable circle, or when, intoxicated by the Socratic chalice and by
Socratic friendship I would Usten at the meal to the enchanted youths as
they would pay tribute to the sacred love with tender, fiery speech, and
how the jester Aristophanes would poke fun underneath, and finally how
the master, the divine Socrates himself with his heavenly wisdom would
teach them all what is love....
—^And yet, sadly, these divine hours do not last, and they even present themselves, both in recollec
tion and in present experience, not as occasions of full abandonment to natural and social worlds of love,
but instead as transitory moments of felt union, on the part of a subject who remains apart, marked by re
flectiveness and dim capabilities of autonomy.
Hence Holderlin arrives, despite his occasional neo-Schillerian attempts “to discover the principle
which explains the divisions in which we think and exist, yet which is also^capable of dispelfing the conflict
between subject and object”’through the positing of “an aesthetic sense” , rather at what Thomas Pfru has
called “a fundamental aporia of philosophical discourse.” Instead of being able to explain the origins of
subject/nature and subject/subject divisions in hopes of overcoming them, human subjects remain caught,
iirHenrich’s formulation,
between two equally legitimate tendencies desipated by the words “love”
and “selfhood.” Sensitive to life and to the beauty of nature, ever devoted
to his relatives, [Holderlin] had a willinpess and even a felt need to
open himself up to whatever he encountered. He learned early on,
however, in the strict educational system of the schools, that selfpreservation is possible only for one capable of relying on himself alone
and, as Holderlin put it, of finding something infinite within himself. As
much as love and selfhood tend to be mutually exclusive, they
nonetheless belong together, and only then constitute a life in its totality.
...Conscious life is at once shaped and unbalanced by the basic
conflicting tendencies oriMitingdt. And the formative process of life aims
at finding a balance and harmony amid this strife, in which no one
tendency is entirely suppressed or denied in its own right.
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Living our hves within the play of these opposed but equally fundamental tendencies, Holderlin finds
that our place as subjects in Being “cannot be grasped other than from an askew perspective” , as these
tendencies show themselves in successive moments of loving attraction and self-rehant resistance that can
not be wholly integrated with one another. In a central image from the Prefece to the 1794 “Fragment of
Hyperion,” we are, Holderlin tells us, as subjects cast on “an ‘excentric path,’ a movement through time
without a coordinating center.”
19

At any moment of this movement, “an external object is necessary,” in order that the fundamental
tendencies of the subject’s life in Being may display themselves through attraction or resistance in relation
to it. Neither Being in itself nor the subject in itself or in its own pure activity can be known directly. A pre
sentation of the life of a subject—a poem—must trace how a subject engages successively with objects of
opposed significances for the subject. The objects of the poet’s attention must be successively beautiful objects,
or objects of love that absorb the subject and support the subject’s sense of harmony, and sublime objects,
or objects of awe that throw the subject back into a sense of independence and reactive self-preservation.
In this way, the life of a subject in Being—a life that involves both absorption and active independence—is
revealed in the poem, and philosophical characterizations of the subject become reahstically contentful in
rnumal alternation.
Thus, through this hyperbohc operation according to which the
ideahstic, harmoniously opposed and connected, is not merely
considered as such, as beautiful life, but also as life in general, hence .
also as capable of a different condition, and not of another harmoniously
opposed one, to be sure, but of a direcdy opposed one, a most extreme,
such that this new condition is comparable with the previous one only
through the idea of life in general,—precisely through that does the poet
provide the idealistic with a beginning, a direction, a significance.
What is left, then, as orienting for the subject in its coming to terms with its place in nature and cul
ture, are successive moments of “analepticy4/>«</M«g” or stimulated surmise of possibihties of life, where
surmise is dominated by the play of the fundamental tendencies of love and selfhood. The life, the poetic
spirit, of the subject “exists as such in definite form and progresses through the alternation of moods where
each time the succeeding mood is determined by the preceding one.” (Holderlin’s Wechseltonlehre or
theory of the succession of tones within a poem is the formal counterpart'of the fact of alternating moods in
the life of a subject.)
These alternations of mood, involving plays of stimulated surmise of possibihties of life, are, however,
neither freely controlled by the subject nor simply induced by an overmastering nature. They instead in
volve plays of active attending with passive receiving, such that within them “there operates a heavenly fire
rather than an earthly one.”
In Henrich’s useful summary, Holderlin
interprets the human condition along something like the Mowing lines;
man comes forth from a unitary ground to which he remains connected
in the certainty of the presuppositions of his existence and of the
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possibility of a new unity. At the same time, he is bound to a world that,
hke himself, originates in opposition. For the sake of unity he strives
actively beyond each of its boundaries. Yet in it he at once confronts the
beautiful—an anticipation of the unity that is lost to him and that he
seeks to restore. As he embraces the beautiful, the complete truth, which
lies at an infinite distance, is reahzed for him within limits. He is thus
captivated by it, and for good reason. But he must not forget that his
active nature is called upon to overcome the finite. In this conflict of love
and selfhood he runs his course, either errantly or with selfunderstanding.
Poetic art will then describe and enact this course of life, not from a place without, but participatively,
as the play of absorption and striving m the poem repeats the play of absorption and striving in life. “Art,
like the consummate life, will but repeat harmoniously the processes of the actual, and deliver its opposi
tions fi'om their conflict through completeness and order.”

2.
“Heidelberg” is one of Holderlin’s shorter lyrics, written in 1798-1800, probably in recollection of a
1795 visit to Heidelberg, soon after the poet’s painful separation from Schiller. Its combination of com
pactness, direct address to the city, relatively straightforward syntax, carefully modulated shifts of prompted
attpnding, and final elegiac calm—^unusual in its sureness in Hblderlin’s oeuvre, but still in the register of
memory of the transitory, not of standing triumph—show in an especially clear form the “processes of the
actual” through which the fundamental tendencies of human life are experienced. Here is the entire text:
Heidelberg
Long have I loved you and for my own delight
Would call you mother, give you an artless song.
You, of all towns in our country
The lovehest that ever I saw.

As the forest bird crosses the peaks in flight,
Over the river shimmering past you floats
Airy and strong the bridge.
Humming with sounds of traffic and people.

Once, as if it were sent by gods, enchantment
Seized me as I was passing over the bridge
And the distance with its allure
Shone into the mountainscape.
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And that strong youth, the river, was rushing on down
To the plain, sorrowing-glad, hke the heart that overflows
With beauty and hurls itself.
To die of love, into the floods of time.

You had fed him with streams, the fugitive, given him
Cool shadow, and all the shores looked on
As he followed his way, their image
Sweetly jockeying over the waves.

But into the valley hung heavy the vast
And fate-acquainted fort, by lightnings tom
To the ground it stood on; yet
Eternal sun still poured

Its freshening light across the giant and aging
Thing, and all around was green with ivy,
living; friendly woodlands ran
Murmurous down across the fort.

Bushes flowered all down the slope to where,
In the vale serene, with hills to prop them, shores
For them to cling to, your small streets.
Mid fragrant garden bowers repose.

Heidelberg
Lange lieb’ ich dich schon, mochte dich, mir zur Lust,
Mutter neimen, und dir schenken ein kunsdos Lied,
Du, derVaterlandsstadte
Landlichschonste, so viel ich sah.

Wie der Vogel des Walds iiber die Gipfel fliegt,
Schwingt sich iiber den Strom, wo er vorbei dir glanzt,
Leicht und kraftig die Briike,
Die von Wagen und Menschen tont.

Wie von Gottern gesandt, fesselt’ ein Zauber einst
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Auf die Briike mich an, da ich voriiher gieng,
Und herein in die Berge
Mir die reizende Feme schien.

Und der Jiingling, der Strom, fort in die Ehne zog,
Traurigfroh, wie das Herz, wenn es, sich selhst zu schon,
Liebend unterzugehen.
In die Fluthen der Zeit sich wirft.

Quellen hast du ihm, hattest dem Fluchtigen
Kiihle Schatten geschenkt, und die Gestade sahn
All’ ihm nach, und es bebte
Aus den Wellen ihr lieblich Bild.

Aber schwer in das Thai hieng die gigantische,
Schicksaalkundige Burg nieder bis auf den Grund,
Von den Wettem zerrissen;
Doch die ewige Sonne goss

Ihr verjiingendes Licht iiber das alterade
Riesenbild, und umher griinte lebendiger
Epheu; freundliche Walder
Rauschten iiber die Burg herab.

Strauche bliihten herab, bis wo im heitera Thai,
An den Hiigel gelehnt, oder dem Ufer hold.
Peine frohhchen Gassen
Unter duftenden Garten mhn.
Stracturally, the poem consists of five sentences mnning across the eight strophes: sentence 1 = stro
phe 1; sentence 2 = strophe 2; sentence 3 = strophes 3 and 4; sentence 4 = strophes 5,6, and 7; sentence
5 = strophe 8. As the sentences increase in length, the imaginative action intensifies. The first three lines of
strophe 6 (“Aber schwer...”) form the point of greatest tension, with the resolution beginning in the fourth
line of that strophe, with the calming “Doch....” The seventh strophe establishes the content of the resolu
tion of the imaginative action; the eighth strophe—a sentence on its own—is then a concluding, shorter
apposition to that resolution, reinforcing it in its own brevity and arriving at the final “mhn.”
The two sentences that form the first two strophes are fully apostrophic, directly addressed to the city
(“dich”). The present tense of the second strophe (“schwingtsich,” “gjanzt,” “tont”) offers direct description
of the city. This direct description is mixed with the more indirect past tense (“Lang lieb’ ich cUch schon”)
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and subjunctive (“mochte”) of the first strophe. In that first strophe, the poet-persona is both recalling the
city and trying to establish or resolve a relation to it. He would call it mother and would send or give it an
artless song. The second, more directly descriptive strophe seems to make it dear why the city is the ap
propriate object of such wishes. The bridge swings itself, at once almost agentively and freely, airily, hke
the fiights of birds and it does so fightly and powerfully (“leicht and kraftig”) as though its power and
effort were for it matters of ease and grace, again fike the fiights of birds. It combines artifactuahty with
naturalness. The vaulting movement and the functioning of the bridge in spanning the river serve as images
of the accomphshed task of a poet, who might hope to arrive at a graceful and powerful wedding of natural
voice with the conventions and craft of language, so as to support a human community in its endeavors.
The bridge sounds (“tout”) of both the people and their works, as it bears the wagons that they have built
to carry their goods.
Yet the poet is at the same time separated from these works and fi-om the bridge’s and the city’s accomphshments in supporting and housing them. He is not now in Heidelberg, but is instead remembering
it, the city he once saw, and he would call it mother and sing to it, but perhaps cannot do so, at least not
with the naturalness of the bridge and of the fiights of birds. Why not? What has happened?
Strophes 3 through 6, line 3 fill in the answer. They are written in a further past tense, as a recollec
tion within recollection. Perhaps the poet is remembering that during his 1795 flight fromJena he had stopped
on the bridge in Heidelberg, just where earher he had once stopped in enchantment. Once, earUer, he had
been seized or chained (“fesselt”’), stopped in his tracks, fully absorbed in the scene presented to him
from his vantage point on the bridge. His gaze at this earlier time is first filled by the mountains in the charming
distance (“die reizende Feme"), which appear to him (“Mir ...schien”) almost agentively, beneficently. It
then falls to theNeckar, rushing beneath the bridge, sorrowing-glad (“traurigfroh’’), drawing or arcing forth
into the plain, where its noisome sad-gladness will flatten out into a calm, thence to empty, to throw itself
(“sich wirft”) into the sea.
The river, too, is an image of a poet’s accomplished task, now more clearly accomphshed within time,
within a mortal life. The river seems to bear a kind of chthonic vocation. It stands in reciprocity with hu
man life, as it carries the image of the city, is fed by the smaUer streams that flow through the city into it, is
given the shadows of its banks, and looked on by its shores. The streams, shadows, and images that the
river carries mediate and reconcile the natural flow of the river with the artifactual life of the people and
city on its shores. This carrying, and this reconciling of the natural with the artifactual, within a mortal life
in time, offer an image of a poet able to speak, both independently, namrally, autonomously; going his own
way, like the river, and in harmony, reciprocity, and love with the life of the people and with the social world
of human commerce, where the buildings stand. All seems to be well.
“But....” ("Aber....”). The poem pivots on this word, which makes it clear that this earher scene, the
recollection within a recollection, is also a scene of trauma. The poet’s gaze lifts firom the stream. It finds
that heavy in the valley hangs the gigantic fort, versed in fate. The fort is at the very least a reminder of hu
man conflict. People build forts to control boundaries and commerce and to surround themselves with
protection. Hence there wifi be, for any poet, resistances to the poet’s work from within the social world,
resistances undergirded by opposed natural routes of desire and interest. The fort seems in its size, its heavi
ness, and its foreboding hanging, to be both an artifact, made by men, and naturalized, an inevitable and
unavoidable something. Any effort at the blending of autonomy and independence with love and reciprocity

Holderlin's Ethical Thinking

61

must end, at least in part, in oppositions, in encounters with resistances. Psychoanalytically, these might be
paternal. What is more important, however, is that these resistances present themselves as xmavoidable, as
the gigantic fort fills the poet’s gaze, and as terrifying. Human social life in nature is a scene not only of
partial reciprocities within the social and between the human and the natural, but also a scene, always, of
oppositions, for poets and for anyone burdened with conceptual consciousness, given over to efforts at
expressiveness, and cast into the floods of time.
Yet “Heidelberg” is nonetheless a lyric, not a desperate lamentation. In a second dramatic pivot, com
ing on the “Doch” (“yet”), the poet accepts this unavoidable condition, just as the fort accepts the poured
out rays of the sun, which shine, lightening, alike on those who will hear the poet and those who will not.
Around the fort, and around us, there is a freshening light, making for youth and innocence (“verjiingendes
Licht”), and also hving ivy and friendly woods. Running up and down the lulls on which they lean, and along
the banks of the river, and amidst fragrant gardens, the cheerful streets rest, repose (“ruhn”), and so also
the ways and manners of the people. The freshening hght of the sun shines, betimes, on the just and the
unjust, the great and the small, the tradesmen and the poets, in their rounds of affairs, in the streets that
carry their business. This sense of the repose of things that comes over the poet does not support any moral
or doctrine of manners or human life. It is rather something rnore like an acknowledgement in reflective
recollection of the conditions of human life as such.

3.
what are we to make of this lyric? Its teaching, if it has one, reposes on no discovery of moral facts
about right and wrong. It offers us no principles to orient our actions. It is rather a vehicle of the acknowl
edgment of a condition simultaneously of hope to negotiate the experience of the fundamental tendencies
of love and selfhood, of the frustration of that hope, and of the moderation of despair. It offers us neither
the prophetic eschatology of the re-presencing of Being that Heidegger would see in Holderhn—something
that is in fact never an option in Holderlin—nor the modernist apotheosis of resistance that Adorno would
see in him. Instead, as a lyric, it records recollection, as it is experienced by a human being hving out the
fundamental tendencies of human life. In this, HolderUn decisively rejects the representationahst conceit
that would suppose that we can or ought to settle decisively on a definite ethical poficy (“the greatest good
for the greatest number;” “fair conditions of economic competition”) as a full embodiment of right.
In resisting both the triumphant discovery of practice-orienting moral facts and moral despair, “Heidel
berg” endorses the conceptual priority of Tugendlehre avet Rechtslebre: our moral aspirations that come
with conceptual consciousness and reflectiveness arise prior to and necessarily found commitment to any
definite poficies of right, whether legally enforceable or as a moral code. (It is hard to see how any social
contract or ethical poficy could lay claim to rational allegiance in the absence of this priority of Tugendlehre

aver Rechtslehre. Without it, commitments to social institutions and to patterns of action would have to
arise not out of ethical aspirations grounded in objective interests, but out of competitive subjective inter
ests as, at best, devices of social compromise and coping with fife.)
It is possible to criticize such a stance, as Hegel did criticize it, for its subjectivism, in its lack of any
commitment to any definite poficies of right As Hegel remarks about the “so-called ‘beautiftjl soul’”, plau
sibly identified with Holderlin:
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It lives in dread of besmirching the splendour of its inner being by action
and an existence; and, in order to preserve the purity of its heart, it flees
from contact with the actual world, and persists in its self-willed
impotence to renounce its self, which is reduced to the extreme of
ultimate abstraction, and to give itself a substantial existence, or to
transform its thought into being and put its trust in the absolute
difference [between thought and being]. The hollow object which it has
produced for itself now fills it, therefore, with a sense of emptiness. Its
activity is a yearning which merely loses itself as consciousness becomes
an object devoid of substance, and, rising above this loss, and falling
back on itself, finds itself only as a lost soul. In this transparent purity of
its moments, an unhappy, so-called ‘beautifiil souT, its light dies away
within it, and it vanishes like a shapeless vapour that dissolves into thin
air.
But is this Hegelian criticism quite right? Holderlin’s lyrical tracing and enactment of the condition of
human consciousness in its natural and social surrounds does not clearly involve any moral subjectivism
or quietism, any rejection of either action or commitment to public laws and institutions. If anything, Holderlin
in “Heidelberg” is committed to the thought that there will be action, within a structured social space, as he
is for only a moment stopped on the bridge, or stopped in the recollection of being stopped on the bridge.
There is no sense that action is futile or that the objective social structure is simply to be rejected.
Yet there will be resistances and oppositions that any course of action and life will encounter. The social
world resists full reformation and perfection. Contrary to Hegel, the oppositions to be faced in courses of
life and action do not lie entirely within the social world and cannot all be worked through to yield social
transparency and reciprocal recognition (with only routine punishments and rebalancings of social life).
The sources of opposition fie deeper than the social, in the primordial feet for human consciousness of the
original Ur-theil. As Heniich notes, for Hegel opposition leads to “what Hegel calls ‘development’; the working
out of increasing determination on the basis of the indeterminate..., [Whereas] in Holderlin’s thought ...ev
erything is separation, modulation, and exchange....”
But it is also not all, not always and necessarily, sheerly subjective and fectional opposition, within
one’s own desires or among us, to be negotiated by brute acts of will and the workings of a competitive
market. The aspiration to unity—^with oneself in the rational coherence of desires, and with others in love
and social reciprocity, but also without any sacrifice of autonomy or independence—^persists. This aspira
tion can be acknowledged and acted on, if not stilled by full success in the embodiment of value.
The feet of this aspiration, if it is a feet, may support a continually self-reforming commitment, quite
different from moral a priorism, to a very abstract moral norm, a categorical imperative, without yielding
any definite way of going on to act productively according to that imperative. Acknowledgment of such a
standing aspiration, within oneself and others, prevents one from adopting a wholly exterior standpoint on
moral attimdinizing, in the causal-explanation-seeking styles of Quine or Hume or New Historldsm. One
finds oneself within the processes of the acmal, with one’s objective aspirations for love and selfhood. Yet
self-reforming commitment to an abstract moral norm, arising out of such acknowledgment, will not over
come the force of resistances to come, nor will it afford any achieved unification of the self with itself and
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others, under any definite moral or social poUcy. All this is the standing moral force of this kind of lyric
writing.
' Hence we find in “Heidelberg,” in a phrase that Simon Critchley has usefully coined for poetry in gen
eral, “a fleeting saying of a fleeting thing by a fleeting being,” in which the fundamental tendencies of life,
“the processes of the actual,” are made available for our acknowledgment. In such acknowledgment, one
finds oneself identifying oneself as leading a human life within these processes, in standing, imperfect pur
suit of love and selfhood. Thinking about and through our entanglement in these processes is one central
part of what ethical thinking is and ought to be.
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